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Summary. Inappropriate risk-taking and disadvantageous decision-making
have been described as major behavioural characteristics of patients with
attention-deficit=hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). However these behav-
iours are difficult to measure in laboratory contexts and recent studies
have yielded inconsistent results which might be related to task character-
istics. The present study adopted the Game of Dice Task, a test procedure in
which risks are made explicit and the load on working memory is minimal.
As a result, preadolescents with ADHD (N¼ 23) made significantly more
risky choices and suffered major losses of money compared to normal con-
trols (N¼ 24) but only when they played the game a second time. Differ-
ences in risk-taking correlated significantly with hyperactivity as rated by
parents and with inhibitory control, but not with working memory per-
formance. The results are discussed in the context of current theories of
ADHD.
Keywords: Attention-deficit=hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); risk-tak-
ing; decision-making; impulsivity; reward; gambling-task; probabilistic
discounting
Introduction
Inappropriate decision-making and unnecessary risk-taking
in everyday situations have been described as major char-
acteristics of ADHD (Barkley 2006; Williams and Taylor
2006). It is controversial, however, whether this should be
attributed to cognitive or to motivational=emotional causes.
Recent theories have claimed that ADHD originates from
multiple pathways: a motivational pathway with a predom-
inant dysregulation of the reward system, and one or
several cognitive pathways which cause impairments of
executive functions, especially of working memory and
self-regulatory abilities (Castellanos and Tannock 2002;
Sonuga-Barke 2003, 2005; Castellanos et al. 2006). In ad-
dition, a motor pathway seems to contribute to deficits of
inhibitory control, especially in younger children with
ADHD (Moll et al. 2001; Yordanova et al. 2006).
In adolescents, risky decision-making has been linked
to sociopathic tendencies (Blair et al. 2001), to substance
abuse, externalizing behavioural disorder and conduct
disorder (Ernst et al. 2003a; Crowley et al. 2006). Devel-
opmental studies on decision-making show a protracted
developmental course until young adulthood (Hooper et al.
2004; Crone et al. 2005; Eshel et al. 2007) and some
authors conclude that young children’s decision-making
resembles that of adult patients with orbitofrontal damage
(Crone and van der Molen 2004). Normal adolescence is a
period of life that is particularly characterized by inappro-
priate risk-taking and novelty seeking (Kelley et al. 2004)
and by a vulnerability to gambling, which has been ex-
plained by a transitional increased cognitive impulsivity
due to the immaturity of frontal cortical and subcortical
monoaminergic systems (Chambers and Potenza 2003).
Only a limited number of objective procedures are avail-
able to assess motivational impairments. The best evaluated
task for emotional decision-making is the Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT) (Bechara et al. 1994, 2000). In the IGT, the
participant draws cards from several decks connected with
different probabilities of wins or losses, which are un-
known to the participant at the beginning of play. Normal
individuals learn quickly which deck to select from in order
to maximize outcomes, whereas patients with damage to
the orbitofrontal cortex continue to select cards from the
decks connected with infrequent high gains and frequent
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high losses. It has been suggested that the Iowa Gambling
Task can be divided into two stages which tap two different
types of decision-making: a first stage of ambiguous
choice, where the risk linked to the different options is
still unknown, and a second stage of risky decision-mak-
ing where the probability of outcome has been learned
(Bechara et al. 1997, see Brand et al. 2007b). This latter
type of decision-making seems to be connected to more
affectively-loaded ‘‘hot’’ executive functions. According to
a meta-analysis by Krain and Castellanos (2006), risky
decision-making is associated with activity of the orbito-
frontal cortex, while ambiguous decision-making seems to
be associated with dorsolateral frontal activity. However,
the extent to which emotional decision-making on the IGT
is confounded by cognitive functioning, such as working
memory, cognitive flexibility, or deductive reasoning, re-
mains controversial. Several studies report impaired perfor-
mance on the IGT in patients with working memory deficits
or amnesia (Manes et al. 2002; Gutbrod et al. 2006).
Children and adults with ADHD have been found to be
impaired on the IGT (Ernst et al. 2003b; Toplak et al. 2005;
Garon et al. 2006), but results are inconsistent: according to
the study of Garon et al. (2006), impaired decision-making
in ADHD is confined to children without symptoms of
depression. Ernst et al. (2003a) found group differences
between participants with ADHD and controls, but only
in a second test session, and Geurts et al. (2006) failed to
find group differences at all.
In ADHD research, decision-making has also been
addressed from a perspective of temporal or probabilistic
discounting (e.g. Barkley et al. 2003; Scheres et al. 2006).
In the latter, subjects have to make choices between small
rewards delivered with high probability and large rewards
delivered with small or variable probabilities. Scheres et al.
(2006) failed to find differences between children with
ADHD and controls on a probabilistic discounting task
which, at least in part, was explained by characteristics
of the procedure used in the study.
In order to control for cognitive functional overlap as far
as possible, the Game of Dice Task (GDT), a risk-taking
task with explicit rules developed by Brand et al. (2004),
was selected for the current study. In the GDT, subjects
carry out decisions on a computerized dice game, choosing
between four possible outcomes: two of them are high risk
choices, associated with high gains and a major probability
to lose, and two are low risk choices, associated with small
gains and a high probability to win (see the Material and
methods section for a description). The GDT matches a
familiar game and the probabilities for wins and losses re-
main stable all the time so that participants do not have to
infer and memorize rules. Also no waiting time is involved.
Different groups of patients seem differentially impaired
on this task (Brand et al. 2004, 2005a, b, 2006, 2007b):
individuals with pathological gambling start with a cau-
tious response strategy and end up with an enhanced ten-
dency for risky choices, which is interpreted as a loss of
attraction of the safer alternatives during the game (Brand
et al. 2006), due to a failure of the reward system. In
contrast, Parkinson patients’ increased tendency to make
risky decisions is equally distributed over the game, which
is interpreted as due to cognitive problems: They start with
a disadvantageous strategy or no strategy at all and partly
fail to learn the reward-alternative and punishment-alterna-
tive associations (see Brand et al. 2004). In patients with
cognitive impairment, decision-making on the GDT corre-
lates with performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Task, but not with working memory or control of interfer-
ence. This suggests a relation to executive functioning, as
far as strategy application is involved. In contrast to other
probabilistic discounting tasks, however, no re-evaluation
of chances is needed and the rules of the game remain
stable. Once the rules are understood, the player can select
his strategy as he wishes and does not have to take into
account continuously changing probabilities. Therefore re-
sponse tendencies during repetitive trials may show differ-
ent trajectories than in other gambling tasks.
The aims of the present study are to investigate whether
and to what extent young adolescents with ADHD can be
distinguished from normal controls by their performance
on an explicit risk-taking task, and whether a tendency
towards risky choices is related to impaired cognitive per-
formance or to clinical behavioural symptoms. As a general
hypothesis, we expect adolescents with ADHD to differ
from normal controls. Two competing predictions will be
tested: 1. If children with ADHD shift from cautious to-
wards more risky choice alternatives, such as observed in
pathological gamblers, we would conclude that the affec-
tive valence of reward gradually changes during the course
of the task. In this case we would expect decision-making
to be increasingly influenced by impulsive components and
correlated with deficits in inhibitory control. 2. If children
with ADHD fail to choose a convenient strategy because of
cognitive impairment – or eventually fail to understand the
task at all – they would demonstrate a disadvantageous
decision-making – strategy from the beginning with no
or only slight improvement towards the end of the game.
In this case we would expect a positive correlation with
performance deficits in executive tasks related to planning
and flexibility, and elevated scores in corresponding clini-
cal scales.
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Material and methods
Participants
Twenty three preadolescents with ADHD participated in the study, 2 girls
and 21 boys (combined subtype N¼ 16, hyperactive=impulsive subtype
N¼ 2, inattentive subtype N¼ 5; see Table 1 for a description of the
sample). They were recruited from the Department of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, University of Zurich. The Conners’ Teacher Rating Scale –
CTRS-R:L (Conners 1997, 2002) and the German version of the SNAP –
Rating Scale (Swanson 1992) were used as initial selection instruments.
HYPESCHEME, a computerized operational criteria checklist and diagnos-
tic algorithm for DSM-IV and ICD-10 which includes a diagnostic interview
(PACS: Taylor et al. 1986) was used to confirm the diagnosis (see Curran
et al. 2000). For three participants, parents were not available for interviews.
Diagnostic classification in these cases was based on clinical diagnoses from
the child psychiatrist running the treatment program and from previous
diagnostic information provided for referral. Adolescents with severe
ODD=CD were excluded from the study after the initial screening. Howev-
er, three children with ADHD who fulfilled the criteria of comorbid ODD
according to the subsequent assessment remained in the group. Sixteen
patients with ADHD were taking stimulant medication which they stopped
at least 24 h prior to testing. Twenty-four normal developing children par-
ticipated in the study as controls, 23 boys and 1 girl, who had been recruited
from public schools in the Zurich area. Controls who scored above the
clinical cut-off on the SNAP or on Conners’ Teacher Rating Scale were
excluded from the study. All participants were aged between 11 and 13
years. The participants gave informed consent and written consent was
obtained from all parents. The study had been approved by the local ethical
committee.
Game of Dice Task
In this computerized task, participants have to guess the outcome of a dice
game in order to maximize their gains. They choose between different
combinations of dice by clicking on the computer screen – on one die, or
combinations of two, three or four dice – associated with different proba-
bilities for gains and losses (see Fig. 1). If they choose a combination of four
dice, the probability of an advantageous outcome is 4:6 and the possible
gain or loss is 100 Euro. If they choose a combination of three dice (winning
probability 3:6) they win or lose 200 Euro, if they choose two dice (winning
probability 2:6) they may lose or win 500 Euro. If they choose the highest
risk, one single die, the probability of a favourable outcome is 1:6 and the
possible gain or loss is 1000 Euro. Participants begin the game with a fictive
amount of 1000 Euro. In each round one single die is thrown: if the outcome
is included in the chosen combination the player wins, otherwise he loses
the corresponding amount (i.e. when he chooses the combination ‘‘1, 2, 3,
4’’ and the outcome of the first round is ‘‘3’’, the player wins 100 Euro, but
Table 1. Descriptive data of preadolescents with ADHD and controls
ADHD Controls T p
(N¼ 23) (N¼ 24)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Age 12.2 (0.8) 11.9 (0.6) 1.640 n.s.
IQ 101.3 (10.7) 108.5 (18.5) 1.543 n.s.
SNAP (raw scores)
Hyperactivity 6.0 (3.8) 1.5 (2.0) 4.923 
Impulsivity 5.7 (2.8) 1.5 (1.6) 6.205 
Inattention 17.2 (5.1) 6.8 (6.0) 6.431 
Oppositional-defiant 10.1 (5.4) 4.6 (4.3) 3.811 
CBCL (T-scores)
Withdrawn 58.7 (15.2) 53.7 (5.9) 1.459 n.s.
Somatic complaints 58.8 (10.4) 53.6 (6.0) 2.067 
Anxious-depressed 62.6 (10.9) 54.9 (7.5) 2.781 
Social problems 63.0 (11.3) 53.8 (5.0) 3.576 
Thought problems 59.8 (10.1) 52.9 (7.3) 2.666 
Attentional problems 67.3 (8.0) 54.9 (6.1) 5.870 
Delinquent behaviour 67.8 (13.2) 53.4 (6.9) 4.595 
Aggressive behaviour 67.2 (11.8) 54.1 (6.39) 4.665 
BRIEF (raw scores)
Inhibit 20.2 (4.8) 13.3 (3.4) 5.448 
Shift 14.0 (3.2) 12.0 (5.4) 2.090 
Emotional control 21.3 (4.4) 13.6 (4.5) 5.554 
Initiate 16.6 (3.9) 10.9 (2.9) 5.485 
Working memory 23.2 (4.7) 14.8 (4.1) 6.347 
Plan=organize 27.4 (5.6) 17.4 (4.4) 6.617 
Organization of material 14.3 (3.6) 9.2 (3.2) 5.061 
Monitor 18.6 (2.9) 13.1 (3.8) 5.317 
n.s. Non significant,  p<0.05,  p<0.01,  p<0.001.
Fig. 1. The Game of Dice Task (from Brand
et al. 2004, modified)
Explicit risk-taking in ADHD 203
when the outcome is ‘‘5’’, he loses 100 Euro). Gains or losses are indicated
on the screen and accompanied by pleasant or aversive sounds. The number
of rounds and the current account are visible on the screen throughout the
game.
Selections of one or two dice were classified as ‘‘risky’’ choices and
selections of combinations of three or four dice as ‘‘safe’’ choices. Partici-
pants performed two games, a first game of 18 rounds followed immediately
by a second game of 12 rounds. As the game is not preceded by training
trials, it was hypothesized that the first 6 rounds of the GDT might be
considered as a preliminary orienting phase, whereas rounds 7–18 can be
considered as a stage of risky decision-making. For that reason, in the
statistical analysis, rounds 7–18 of game 1 were compared to rounds 1 to
12 of game 2. Participants were informed that the second game would be
shorter and the number of total rounds was visible throughout the games.
Cognitive tests
Participants performed a series of standardized neuropsychological test
procedures. Working memory was assessed by ‘‘Digit span’’ (WISC III)
and by a computerized 2-back-task, the subtest ‘‘Working Memory’’ from
the Test for Attentional Performance (TAP) (Zimmermann and Fimm 2002).
In this task, different numbers appear consecutively one by one on the
screen. Participants have to press the response button as quickly as possible
when the number currently seen on the screen is identical to the number
that was presented two items before. To assess response inhibition, a com-
puterized Go=Nogo task was performed (Subtest ‘‘Go=Nogo’’, TAP,
Zimmermann and Fimm 2002). In this task participants are instructed to
respond as quickly as possible when an ‘‘X’’ symbol is presented in the
centre of the screen and to withhold responding when a plus-symbol (‘‘þ ’’)
appears. Complex executive functions (planning, response to feedback,
mental flexibility, observation of rules) were assessed by a 64-item comput-
erized version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) (Heaton and Par
2000) and by the Tower of London (Culbertson and Zillmer 2001). A
continuous performance task (CPT) was used to evaluate sustained attention
(subtest ‘‘Vigilance’’, TAP, Zimmermann and Fimm 2002). In this version
of the CPT, which has a duration of 10 min, participants have to press a
response button when the appearance of the letter ‘‘E’’ in the centre of the
computer screen is preceded by a high pitched tone or when the letter ‘‘N’’
is preceded by a low pitched tone. Finally, IQ was calculated based on a
short form of the German version of the WISC III, including Arithmetic,
Block Design, Vocabulary, and Picture Arrangement subtests (Schallberger
2005).
Behavioural scales
Parents rated behaviour on the Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive
Function (BRIEF) (Gioia et al. 2000), a German version of the Swanson,
Nolan and Pelham (SNAP) rating scale (Swanson 1992) and the Child
Behavior Checklist (CBCL) (Achenbach 1991) (Table 1).
Results
Game of Dice Task
In the first game adolescents with ADHD made as many
risky choices as controls, i.e. they chose a single die or
combinations of two dice with the same frequency as con-
trols. The financial outcome did not differentiate between
the groups (Table 2). A similar result was obtained when
only rounds 7–18 of Game 1 were included, departing
from the hypothesis that the first choices might be consid-
ered as a stage of preliminary orientation or ambiguous
decision-making and therefore should not necessarily be
entered in an analysis of deliberate risk-taking (Table 2).
When the 18 rounds of the Game 1 were divided into three
blocks of 6 trials, as suggested by Brand et al. (2006),
and the results were entered into a repeated measures
MANOVA, no effects of block (F¼ 0.988, p¼ 0.381) no
group differences (F¼ 0.095, p¼ 0.760) and no interaction
(F¼ 1.200, p¼ 0.311) were found, indicating that during
the course of the first game no major changes of the deci-
sion-making strategy occurred.
In the second game of 12 rounds, preadolescents with
ADHD made significantly more risky decisions and ended
up with a higher financial loss compared to normal controls
(Table 2). When the results of Game 1 (trial 7–18) and
Game 2 were entered into a repeated measures MANOVA
(groupgamefinancial outcome, risky decisions), a main
effect of group (Wilks’ Lambda¼ 0.838, F¼ 4.247, p¼
0.021) and of game by group (Wilks’ Lambda¼ 0.831,
F¼ 4.472, p¼ 0.017) emerged, whereas the effect for game
was not significant. Post-hoc analyses showed that the in-
teraction of game by group was significant for the number
of risky choices (F¼ 5.761, p¼ 0.021) as well as for the
financial outcome (F¼ 7.627, p¼ 0.008). To evaluate
which of the two groups showed major changes from one
game to the next, results of Game 1 (rounds 7–18) and
Game 2 were compared separately for both groups using
paired t-tests. For the adolescents with ADHD a significant
increase in the number of risky choices between Games 1
and 2 (p¼ 0.046) was found, but only a trend for
the decrease in the financial outcome (p¼ 0.067). In con-
trast, control participants showed a strong trend for an
Table 2. Results of the Game of Dice Task
ADHD Controls T p
(N¼ 23) (N¼ 24)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Game 1, total (18 rounds)
Number of risky
choices
6.3 (4.3) 6.1 (3.7) 0.153 n.s.
Financial outcome 1060 (2224) 983 (3491) 0.0991 n.s.
Game 1 (rounds 7–18)
Number of risky
choices
4.13 (3.27) 3.37 (2.49) 0.886 n.s.
Financial outcome 430 (2131) 162 (2007) 0.443 n.s.
Game 2 (12 rounds)
Number of risky
choices
5.60 (3.7) 2.9 (2.8) 2.833 
Financial outcome 1734 (2866) 820 (1480) 3.815 
n.s. Non significant,  p<0.01,  p<0.001.
204 R. Drechsler et al.
improvement in the financial outcome (p¼ 0.056) but the
number of risky choices did not change from one game to
the next (p¼ 0.278). The frequencies of choices for the
four response alternatives were analyzed separately in a
repeated measures MANOVA (group by game by choice
alternatives) in order to investigate more fine-grained
changes in the decision-making behaviour. Only a trend
for an overall group-effect was found (Wilks’ Lambda¼
0.823, F¼ 2.252, p¼ 0.080), but the interaction of game by
group was significant (Wilks’ Lambda¼ 0.803, F¼ 2.571,
p¼ 0.052). Post-hoc analyses revealed a significant effect
for the most risky choice alternative (F¼ 10.560, p¼
0.002): participants with ADHD chose the most risky al-
ternative (one die) more frequently in Game 2 than in
Game 1 (Fig. 2).
Relation between neuropsychological performance
and risky decision-making
Differences between the groups on the neuropsychological
tests were not very pronounced and confined to aspects of
inhibitory control. Adolescents with ADHD made more
errors on the Go=Nogo Task, produced more rule breaks
on the Tower of London and made more commission errors
on the CPT (Vigilance Task, TAP). No differences were
found on the WCST, the Working Memory Task of TAP
and Digit Span (Table 3).
When performances of participants with ADHD on the
neuropsychological tests were correlated with the number
of risky choices and financial outcomes (controlled for
age), only one significant correlation emerged: the number
of commission errors on the CPT was related to a low
financial outcome in Game 2 (r¼0.49, p¼ 0.026). This
was not the case for controls (r¼0.105, p¼ 0.634). In the
control group, the correlations between omissions in
the working memory task and risky choices in Game 1
(r¼0.539, p¼ 0.008) and Game 2 (r¼0.718, p¼
0.000) were highly significant. For the ADHD group, no
such relation was found (Game 1: r¼0.331, p¼ 0.132,
Game 2: r¼0.156, p¼ 0.488).
Relation between risky decision-making
and behavioural ratings
Subscales of behavioural ratings were correlated with the
financial outcome and the number of risky decisions in
Games 1 and 2, respectively (Table 4). In the ADHD group
the risky decision-making of Game 1 was moderately cor-
related with the ‘‘Hyperactivity’’-subscale of the SNAP,
with ‘‘Attentional Problems’’ and ‘‘Aggressive Behavior’’
(CBCL), and the ‘‘Initiate’’-subcale of the BRIEF. Risky
decision-making of Game 2 was correlated with the ‘‘Hy-
peractivity’’-subscale from the SNAP and ‘‘Attentional
Table 3. Results of neuropsychological tests
ADHD Controls t=Z p
(N¼ 23) (N¼ 24)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Digit span (Hawik III) 9.17 (2.9) 9.3 (2.6) 0.139a n.s.
Go=nogo (TAP) errors 6.0 (4.8) 3.0 (3.0) 2.173b 
Working memory (TAP)
Omissions 4.0 (2.9) 4.0 (2.8) 0.312b n.s.
Correct responses 10.3 (2.8) 10.8 (2.7) 0.538a n.s.
WCST
Categories completed 3.2 (1.4) 2.9 (1.8) 0.136b n.s.
Perseverative errors 8.0 (2.9) 8.5 (4.3) 0.469a n.s.
Failure to maintain set 0.5 (0.7) 0.3 (0.5) 0.413b n.s.
Tower of London
Total moves 32.3 (11.2) 27.6 (8.7) 1.501a n.s.
Rule breaks 0.6 (1.0) 0.1 (0.4) 1.972b 
CPT (‘‘Vigilance’’, TAP)
Omission errors 2.2 (3.1) 1.5 (2.6) 0.195b n.s.
Commission errors 6.4 (5.8) 3.7 (3.9) 2.161b 
n.s. Non significant, a t (t-test), b Z (Whitney-U-test),  p<0.05.
Fig. 2. Distribution of choice alternatives in Games 1 and 2 in young
adolescents with ADHD and controls
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Problems’’ (CBCL). In the control group significant corre-
lations between risky decision-making and behavioural
measures were confined to ‘‘Thought Problems’’ (CBCL).
In the ADHD group the financial outcome of Game 2
was negatively correlated with ‘‘Hyperactivity’’ (SNAP),
‘‘Anxious-Depressed’’ symptoms and ‘‘Attentional Prob-
lems’’ (CBCL), and the ‘‘Inhibit’’-subscale from the
BRIEF, indicating that an elevated number of symptoms
on these scales is related to a lower financial outcome.
In the control group low financial outcome of Game 2
was associated with elevated symptoms of ‘‘Inattention’’
(SNAP) and deficits on the ‘‘Monitor’’-subscale from the
BRIEF.
Discussion
In this study, young adolescents with ADHD made more
risky choices and ended up with a higher financial loss in a
decision-making task with explicit probabilities for gains
and losses compared to controls. However, these differ-
ences only became apparent at the second game, a result
which is surprising when compared to studies on impaired
risky decision-making with the GDT in adult clinical
groups (see Brand et al. 2006). It is possible that both
groups of preadolescents go through a prolonged ambigu-
ous stage of decision-making where they try out the differ-
ent possibilities of the game without a clear-cut strategy. It
might be more difficult for adolescents to fully understand
the task or to change a strategy in the middle of the game,
and they may need a fresh start in order to initiate a more
goal-oriented strategy. Also, differences in response pat-
terns of adolescents with ADHD compared to adult patho-
logical gamblers could be indicative not of a maturational
effect but of a less severe or a different underlying pathol-
ogy. Ernst et al. (2003a) found group differences on the
IGT between adolescents with and without ADHD only
in a second test session, which may be interpreted as poor
learning of risks in the ADHD group. Results of the current
study, however, point towards another interpretation.
In Game 2 both groups of adolescents obviously adopted
a new strategy, however according to different criteria:
Normal young adolescents made more choices that were
aimed at a minimization of losses, which is expressed by a
significantly better financial outcome, although the ratio of
high and low risk choices remained constant compared to
Game 1. Their response style became more tactical, which,
Table 4. Correlations between risky choices and clinical behavioural ratings in preadolescents with ADHD (N¼ 23) and controls (N¼ 24)
Clinical subscale Risky choices Financial outcome
Game 1 Game 2 Game 1 Game 2
ADHD Control ADHD Control ADHD Control ADHD Control
SNAP
Hyperactive 0.43 0.08 0.61 0.29 0.28 0.10 0.46 0.10
Impulsive 0.06 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.14
Inattentive 0.23 0.02 0.27 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.26 0.43
Oppositional-defiant 0.24 0.09 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.37
CBCL
Withdrawn 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.35 0.03
Somatic complaints 0.33 0.10 0.10 0.28 0.11 0.03 0.25 0.27
Anxious-depressed 0.40 0.25 0.32 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.54 0.17
Social problems 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.13 0.16
Thought problems 0.13 0.46 0.09 0.55 0.03 0.32 0.09 0.10
Attentional problems 0.50 0.07 0.48 0.03 0.41 0.16 0.50 0.09
Delinquent behaviour 0.30 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.05 0.15
Aggressive behaviour 0.42 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.16 0.29
BRIEF
Inhibit 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.06 0.24 0.01 0.49 0.37
Shift 0.28 0.34 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.07 0.34
Emotional control 0.33 0.18 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.38
Initiate 0.69 0.17 0.24 0.15 0.48 0.14 0.42 0.15
Working memory 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.24 0.39
Plan=organize 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.03 0.24 0.39
Organization of material 0.34 0.22 0.30 0.20 0.28 0.29 0.41 0.30
Monitor 0.24 0.38 0.10 0.14 0.22 0.12 0.29 0.42
 p<0.05,  p<0.001.
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however, did not affect risk-taking tendencies. In contrast,
the ADHD group opted for a significantly more risky deci-
sion-making strategy, resulting in even greater losses than
at the first game. This latter change of strategy does not
seem indicative of poor learning of rewards or of risks in
the ADHD group – which would imply a decreased fre-
quency of risky decisions in the control group at Game 2 –
but rather suggests a gradual change of the affective value
of feedback. When confronted with novelty, individuals
with ADHD might be indistinguishable from normal con-
trols in their responses to feedback, but when the task
becomes familiar, differences in behaviour may emerge.
This does not imply that the GDT was perceived as boring
by the participants with ADHD: on the contrary, they
seemed excited and often wished to play it again.
Risky choices in the ADHD group were unrelated to
working memory problems or to other neuropsychological
characteristics such as flexibility or planning. Similar
results have been reported by Toplak et al. (2005) using
the Iowa Gambling Task. However, monetary outcome of
Game 2 was correlated with commission errors in the CPT,
indicating an association between deficits in inhibitory con-
trol and inappropriate strategy selection. Control adoles-
cents with low performance on a working memory task
were characterized by a preference for low-risk choices;
a finding which is in contrast to results on decision-making
tasks in clinical groups reported previously (Manes et al.
2002; Brand et al. 2004). However it might be plausible
that non-pathological individuals who have some difficul-
ties in overseeing a complex situation might opt for a low-
risk strategy. Poor cognitive abilities as rated by parents
seemed to contribute to a poor financial outcome in control
children, but they were not related to risk-taking or to
financial losses in children with ADHD: Risky choices
and the financial outcome of Game 2 were unrelated to
symptoms of inattention in the ADHD group, but closely
related to hyperactivity (SNAP) and inhibition (BRIEF).
In the control group, in contrast, risky decision-making
and low financial outcome of Game 2 were linked to some
more cognitive behavioural scales, such as ‘‘Monitor’’
(BRIEF), ‘‘Thought problems’’ (CBCL) or ‘‘Inattention’’
(SNAP). In contrast to other studies, we did not find an
inverse association between anxious-depressed symptoms
and risky decision-making, as reported by Garon et al.
(2006), nor an especially close association with opposition-
al defiant symptoms or aggressiveness (Blair et al. 2001;
Ernst et al. 2003a). Elevated symptom scores on the
‘‘Aggressive Behaviour’’ scale (CBCL) were related to risky
decision-making of Game 1 but not of Game 2. Therefore
it seems rather unlikely that enhanced risk-taking in Game
2 may be reduced to symptoms of a comorbid behavioural
disorder.
Taken all together, the results lend support to our first
hypothesis which claimed an association between risky de-
cision-making and impulsiveness. Adolescents with ADHD
initially may select decision-making strategies based on
‘‘cold’’ cognitive processes just as their age-matched con-
trols. But a gradual shift towards a more impulsive ‘‘hot’’
response style occurs when decisions become cognitively
less demanding. In the Game of Dice Task, probabilities do
not need to be cognitively re-evaluated at each choice, which
progressively may lead to a more risky decision-making
style. Possibly, these task characteristics partly account for
differing outcomes of previous studies.
Our results are in line with explanatory models that link
impulsive behaviour in ADHD to motivational impairments
or to deficits in the interplay between the reward system
and executive functions (Sonuga-Barke 2005; Castellanos
et al. 2006). The exact nature of the motivational deficit
remains still controversial (for a review see Luman et al.
2005) and the complex patterns of interaction between
‘‘hot’’ and ‘‘cold’’ processing pathways are currently sub-
ject of intense research (Haber 2003; Haber et al. 2006, see
Kelly et al. 2007).
Several explanatory hypotheses may account for the
present data: 1. The results of the study suggest a progres-
sively growing insensitivity to negative reinforcement dur-
ing the task. A deficit in the response to negative feedback
has been described as characteristic for ADHD by several
authors (e.g. Quay 1997). 2. Children with ADHD seem to
present an increased sensitivity for the magnitude of
rewards (see Scheres et al. 2006) and might be progressive-
ly drawn towards the largest gain. 3. The arousal associated
with the higher risk could become more rewarding than the
hypothetical reward itself, especially when possible gains
or losses are purely fictitious: The increase of arousal as-
sociated with the ‘‘kick’’ of risk-taking could be placed
over and above any eventual monetary gain and adolescents
with ADHD may opt for the more exciting choice against
better knowledge. Children with ADHD would be driven to
the highest risk rather than to the largest gain. This expla-
nation of ‘‘sensation-seeking’’ when the task has become
habitual would be in accordance with the Cognitive Ener-
getic Theory (Sergeant 2005) which links symptoms of
ADHD to a deficient regulation of arousal and effort.
These explanations do not need to be mutually exclusive
but may contribute differentially to the description of risk-
taking in ADHD. Recent studies have shown that the value
of reward and the estimation of risks are coded in distinct
networks (Tobler et al. 2007), and one may assume that
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subcomponents of the reward system can be separately
affected.
In conclusion, young adolescents with ADHD can be
distinguished from normal controls on a risk-taking task,
although these performance differences do not emerge im-
mediately. Further research is needed in order to evaluate
the impact of specific task characteristics on risky decision-
making in ADHD and to improve the prediction of risk-
taking in real life situations.
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